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Executive summary
This report deals with the question of adopting the euro in Poland. 
It differs from previous such works in two respects. First, our ques-
tion is not “should Poland adopt the euro?” as the EU Treaties oblige 
all Member States who joined the EU after the Maastricht Treaty came 
into force to join the eurozone. Hence, we focus on the implications 
of Poland's decision to delay its adoption of the common currency. Second, in 
contrast to previous studies we distinguish between different types of costs 
and benefits – we identify those which are measurable, those which are po-
tential and those which are non-measurable, i.e. are of socio-political nature. 
In our view such a distinction is required to assess the effects of adopting the 
euro on the Polish economy in a way which incorporates the possible differenc-
es in the preferences of decision-makers and public opinion. Further, we should 
not treat in the same way those consequences of monetary integration which 
are certain and easily measurable (e.g. the reduction of transaction costs) and 
those which are less certain and can only be roughly estimated (e.g. the in-
crease in investment activity or reduction in cost competitiveness of exports).
Our cost and benefit analysis does not yield an unequivocal answer to the 
question of whether and to what extent the Polish government should forego 
preparations for monetary integration. Our objective is to provide an overview 
of the relevant literature and to make the debate more systematic, thus devel-
oping a dynamic framework for further research. 
While the ratio of measurable costs and benefits suggests that adopting 
the euro could give Poland an additional growth stimulus, such an effect would 
be small (0.7 per cent of GDP), i.e. within the margin  of growth forecast error. 
Most significant costs and benefits are the only potential, which are contin-
gent on the institutional framework. Premature and badly prepared monetary 
integration could result in economic losses significantly exceeding the measur-
able benefits of early full EMU membership – our estimates suggest that that 
long-term GDP loss could reach even 7.5 percent. On the other hand, monetary 
integration preceded by sound institutional preparation would bring Poland 
an additional growth stimulus for the next decades - GDP could be higher by 
as much as 7.8 percent. This would be the case in particular with improved 
regulations of labour and financial markets, a relatively weak conversion rate 
of złoty to euro, additionally supported by a responsible and non-populist fiscal 
policy, i.e. budgetary discipline also at the peak of the economic cycle.
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Executive summary
Measurable consequences of delayed euro adoption
higher transaction costs in the economy
higher interest rates on loans
higher public debt servicing costs
no one-off costs of currency conversion
Potential consequences of delayed euro adoption
slower domestic demand growth
slower export growth
no share in the ECB profit disbursement
lower probability of a house price bubble
higher cost competitiveness of the economy
lower price level
smaller amplitude of business cycle fluctuations
Non-measurable consequences of delayed euro adoption
limited influence over political decisions concerning  
the European Union’s future
higher social and political risk resulting from foreign currency 
denominated or indexed loans
higher susceptibility to speculative attacks and risk of crises
no access to funds from the euro area budget
higher independence of economic policy
lower susceptibility to euro area crises
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This section reviews the institutional architecture of the euro area – that is, the 
set-up within which the decision to delay or speed up integration with the common 
currency area is made. 
Monetary integration within the European Union was foreseen as part of the 
European integration project since its inception. It was hardly – as is sometimes 
depicted - the cost borne by Berlin for France not to object to the unification of Ger-
many in 1990s (Mody, 2018). Early reports of the European Commission consider 
monetary integration as the pinnacle of the internal market project – the final step 
of removing barriers between Member States. The necessary economic convergence 
was to be supported by the antecedents of cohesion policies introduced in 1980s by 
the then President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors. Economic and 
Monetary Union finally came into being with the 1992 Maastricht Treaty, and the 
common currency (euro) entered circulation in 12 Member States of the Union on 
1 January 2002. These countries were: Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Greece, 
Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Austria, Portugal and Finland. In 2007 
they were joined by Slovenia, followed by Malta and Cyprus in 2008, Slovakia in 
2009, Estonia in 2011, Latvia in 2014 and Lithuania in 2015. Currently 19 of the 28 
European Union Member States use the euro.
The financial crisis of 2008, which two years later in some of the euro area Mem-
ber States transformed into a sovereign debt crisis, was the first real test of the 
EMU. It has brought to the surface the shortcomings of the European Monetary 
Union construction that contributed to aggravating the economic crisis in some 
countries. These included the lack of safety mechanisms or common supervision 
over the banking sector (Padoa-Schioppa, 2005), which led to disintegration of Eu-
ropean financial markets (a decrease in cross-border transactions, divergence in 
risk assessment of different Member States (Draghi, 2018)). Euro area reforms 
since the crisis had as their objective the reintegration of banking systems of the 
euro area under single supervision, the introduction of risk-sharing (via financial 
markets as well as stabilization mechanisms) and greater synchronization of busi-
ness cycles. New economic governance mechanisms and institutions were intro-
duced (Pisani-Ferry, 2014; Sandbu, 2017), the most significant of which we describe 
below. These reforms have importantly changed the ratio of costs and benefits 
of Poland adopting the euro.
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How to adopt the common currency?
EU Treaties define the eurozone as an area where a common monetary policy is pur-
sued. A distinct institution was created to this end – the European Central Bank (ECB) 
– whose objective is to maintain price stability and, without prejudice to this objective 
– to support economic policies of the Union in accordance with the principle of an open 
market economy with free competition (Art. 119(2) TFEU and Art. 127 TFEU).
All Member States of the EU, apart from Denmark and – until it leaves the EU – 
the United Kingdom, are members of the Economic and Monetary Union. Countries 
which joined the European Union after the Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992 have 
the status of “Member States with a derogation.” These are (in the order of joining 
the EU): Sweden, Czechia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland, Romania and Croatia. These 
countries do not participate in the final (third) phase of the EMU, but are part of some 
of the institutions of monetary integration, such as the European System of Central 
Banks. In accordance with to the Accession Treaties, Poland should aim to converge 
with the euro area.
What conditions have to be fulfilled by Poland  
in order to adopt the euro?
For the derogation from third phase of EMU to be lifted, Poland must fulfil a number 
of legal conditions and reach a sustainable level of convergence determined by the so-
called “Maastricht criteria.” These include:
a high degree of price stability (rate of inflation close to that of the three  
best performing Member States in terms of price stability);
sustainability of government financial position measured by debt levels  
(below 60 per cent of GDP) and deficit (below 3 per cent GDP);
low currency exchange rate fluctuations against the euro within the European  
Monetary System for at least two years (the standard bands are +/- 15 percent,  
but these can be adjusted at the request of the Member State concerned);
sustainable convergence reflected in the long-term interest rates  
(yields of 10 year bonds should be lower than the yields in the three countries  
exhibiting the lowest inflation rate).
Specific measurement conditions were added after 2010. After it was revealed that Greece 
had misinformed European authorities about its fiscal deficit and debt, the EU has intro-
duced various measures to ensure the credibility of national and regional statistical ac-
counts, i.e. that they provide high quality data to evaluate the fulfilment of the Maastricht 
criteria. The European Commission is responsible for monitoring convergence among 
Member States with a derogation. If the country in question fulfils all the criteria, the 
European Commission can request for the derogation to be lifted. The decision is taken 
by the finance ministers of the euro area with a qualified majority, after consulting the 
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European Parliament and the European Council. The exchange rate at which the national 
currency is converted to the euro, as well as any other measures necessary to introduce 
the new currency in the Member States, is set by a unanimous decision of the euro area 
Member States and the Member State concerned, following a consultation with the ECB. 
The decision-making process reflects the fact that the exchange rate is a condition to 
ensure future (and sustainable) cost competitiveness of the economy concerned and to 
avoid an economic slowdown after adopting the common currency.
In 2018 Poland fulfilled two of the formal conditions to join the euro area – only its 
inflation level and public finances complied with the Maastricht criteria. The reference 
interest rate was too high, and the country did not participate in the ERM II Mechanism, 
although the exchange rate was stable in the previous two years and the exchange rate 
criterion could have been fulfilled. In addition, the European Commission and the ECB 
in their 2018 Convergence Reports point out that Polish law does not comply with the 
euro area legal framework. According to the European Commission it did not guarantee 
sufficient independence of the National Bank of Poland (NBP) – the Governor presents 
the monetary policy framework to the Council of Ministers and the finance minister, 
which the Commission considers to be incompatible with the independence require-
ment. From a legal point of view, the provision which allows for the NBP’s Governor to 
be suspended by the State Tribunal is also problematic. The most significant problem, 
however, is posed by Article 227 of the Polish Constitution, which states that the NBP en-
joys the prerogative of issuing the Zloty and conducting monetary policy in Poland – the 
article would have to be amended for the country to be legally able to join the euro area.
Although the formal treaty criteria for joining the euro area have not changed since 
the Maastricht Treaty, in practice the reforms introduced in the EU since the 2008 
crisis  have significantly expanded the range of requirements which must be met by 
a Member State which seeking to adopt the euro. Members of the euro area have agreed 
to greater coordination of economic policies through the so-called European Semester, 
which increases the transparency and mutual accountability of national budgets – these 
are discussed inter alia in the European Parliament. The reform of EMU’s economic 
governance has also increased the powers of the European Commission and Fiscal 
Poland meets the 
Maastricht criteria
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DOES POLAND MEET THE MAASTRICHT CRITERIA?   
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Councils in preparation of national budgets – Member States which fail to comply 
with common rules can be subject to sanctions, while the budgetary procedure 
itself is more reliant on independent expertise.
The new Stability and Growth Pact has additionally introduced a number of new 
convergence measures as part of the Macroeconomic Imbalances Procedure. The 
European Commission now analyses those imbalances which have contributed 
to the crisis since 2008: Member States’ balance of payments, private sector in-
debtedness, house price dynamics. These imbalances are then outlined in a special 
report concerning the macroeconomic stability of individual Member States. If 
the European Commission identifies any specific imbalance, this affects the as-
sessment of convergence, though it does not imply that adopting the euro is not 
possible. Currently Poland does not exhibit any significant imbalances, apart from 
its excessive net international investment position. 
The Stability and Growth Pact has been further strengthened by the Fiscal Com-
pact (De Witte, Héritier and Trechsel, 2013), which obliges the euro area Member 
States inter alia to introduce constitutional rules establishing a debt brake mech-
anism above 60 per cent public debt to GDP. This intergovernmental treaty cre-
ates a new EU decision-making forum, a new EU decision-making forum: the euro 
summits, which are headed by the President of the European Council. Poland is 
a signatory to the Fiscal Compact, although it is not bound by all of its provisions, 
in particular those relating to the automatic debt reduction procedure. It is worth 
noting, however, that a backstop mechanism for debt increase above the 60 per 
cent threshold exists in Polish law, i.a. in the Constitution. 
In 2013 the Eurozone Member States have created the European Stability 
Mechanism (ESM), which allows to provide assistance to Member States experi-
encing public finance problems. The lending capacity of the mechanism is financed 
through state contributions of eurozone Member States, in accordance with their 
GDP. This is regulated by the European Stability Mechanism Treaty, to which all 
euro area countries are signatories.
These institutional innovations amount to additional criteria to be met by new euro 
members. Though it is unlikely that further formal criteria will be added in the near 
future (treaty change would then be necessary), the new European Parliament which 
has emerged after the elections in May 2019 is likely to favour further far-reaching 
Eurozone reform. As already indicated in the priorities of the new European Com-
mission, further proposals can be expected inter alia on measures which strength-
en the international role of the euro or introduce a common deposit insurance for 
the Banking Union. Works on introducing solutions to share risk in the euro area 
will be continued (including proposals to establish a safe asset for the euro area, see: 
The changes in the conditions for joining the euro area can be seen in the example 
of Bulgaria seeking the Eurogroup's approval for the process. In 2018 Bulgaria 
agreed to close cooperation with the Banking Union after entering the ERM II. It also 
agreed to introduce an array of macroprudential instruments, to contain the risk 
of a house price bubble, as well as a number of reforms oriented at strengthening 
the supervision of the banking sector, such as anti-money laundering legislations, 
insolvency law, improving the efficiency of the judiciary and state enterprises.
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Bénassy-Quéré et al., 2018). The euro area Mem-
ber States will continue to strengthen the Banking 
Union, and the role of the ECB in shaping economic 
policies of Member States will be sustained.
Poland fulfils most of the new, soft criteria for 
monetary convergence – it has sound oversight over 
the financial sector and already has deposit and 
resolution funds in place. Before entering the euro 
area, however, it would have to fully integrate with 
the new institutions, including the Banking Union. 
This would imply new administrative burdens and 
economic costs. The Polish economy fulfils most 
of the macroeconomic imbalances criteria and has 
a debt increase backstop mechanism. The primary 
obstacle to adopting the euro is changing art. 227 
of the Polish Constitution and entering the ERM II 
for at least two years.
In general economic terms, Poland is slowly 
converging to the euro area Member States, al-
though the GDP per capita difference is still far 
from the optimum foreseen in theoretical Opti-
mum Currency Area models. GDP per capita in 
Purchasing Power Parity in 2017 was EUR 20,900 
• that is approx. 66 per cent of the euro area aver-
age (in 2009 the respective amount stood at 55 per 
cent). For GDP non-adjusted for purchasing power 
the divergence was higher – 38 per cent of EU level 
in 2018 (37 per cent in 2017). More convergence 
is observed in terms of business cycle synchroni-
sation in Poland and the 12 Member States which 
originally adopted the euro – studies show that 
volatility correlation index increased from 0.48 in 
2005 to 0.98 in 2015 (Boratyński et al, 2019b). This 
effect is facilitated by trade integration (inter- and 
intrasectoral), inflow of EU funds and integration 
of the financial markets. 
Poland signs the EU 
Accession Treaty
Poland joins the EU
Council of Ministers 
adopts the Roadmap on 
introduction of the euro by 
Poland
Office of Government 
Plenipotentiary for Euro 
Adoption is created
National Euro 
Coordination Committee, 
Coordination Council and 
Interinstitutional Working 
Groups on Preparation for 
Euro Adoption by Poland 
are created
Government Plenipotentiary 
presents the Strategic 
Guidelines for the National 
Euro Changeover Plan
The National Bank of Poland 
presents a report on the 
economic challenges 
of Poland’s integration with 
the euro area
The Office of the 
Government Plenipotentiary 
for Euro Adoption  
is abolished
Timetable  
of euro membership 
preparation in Poland
2003
16 April 
2004
1 May
2008
28 October
2009 
13 January 
3 November
2010
26 October 
2014
November 
2015
28 December
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DO YOU THINK THE INTRODUCTION OF THE EURO WOULD BENEFIT YOU PERSONALLY? 
(% of answers)      
Calendar of euro adoption by Poland
Adoption of the euro by Poland was already assumed in the 2003 Accession Treaty. 
The first concrete steps were taken, however, after the 2007 parliamentary elec-
tions. In October 2008 the government presented the Roadmap for the introduction 
of the euro, indicating January 2012 as a possible date for the new currency to be 
introduced. In 2009 the office of Government Plenipotentary for Euro Adoption 
in Poland was created and one year later the Strategic Guidelines for the National 
Euro Changeover Plan were outlined (Pełnomocnik Rządu ds. Wprowadzenia Euro 
przez Rzeczpospolitą Polską, 2010). The financial crisis from 2008 undermined the 
trust in the common currency which brought the euro adoption preparations in Po-
land to a halt. Additionally, Poland was subject to the Excessive Deficit Procedure 
between 2009 and 2015, which was a formal obstacle to adopting the euro. Official 
preparations for the introduction of the common currency were put to an end in 
2015, when the office of the Plenipotentiary was abolished. Since then, the conver-
gence with the euro area is a competence of the Finance Ministry, which publishes 
an annually updated Convergence Programme. 
SUPPORT FOR EURO ADOPTION IN SELECTED COUNTRIES (2018)  
Source: Eurobarometer.
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Survey of social opinions and political  
positions on euro adoption 
Poles’ attitudes towards euro adoption have changed significantly over the last years. 
In the light of the economic crisis in the euro area, they have become more cautious 
in their thinking about the common currency adoption. Before 2004, 40 percentage 
points more Poles were in favour of adopting the euro than against it (Osińska, 2013). 
2009 was a turning point for the euro support as the Polish economy was doing bet-
ter than the rest of the EU. Since then, the share of Poles opposing the introduction 
of the euro is consistently higher than those who are in favour. In 2018, those shares 
were equal to 50 and 48 per cent respectively (Eurobarometer, 2018).
Attitudes of Poles, however, are not uniform. Though Poles believe that the euro 
may benefit them personally, they are less convinced that the common currency 
will benefit the economy as a whole. Significant differences in attitudes concern the 
date of the desirable adoption of the euro – only 16 per cent of Poles believe that 
the euro should be adopted as soon as possible. 48 per cent of them would rath-
er postpone the decision. These attitudes are shaped by macroeconomic factors 
(GDP level, exchange rate policy, unemployment) and individual aspects (political 
preferences, socio-demographic characteristics). Psychological factors, including 
identity, play a significant role in determining the attitudes toward euro adoption 
(Osińska, 2013).
Support for euro adoption is also determined by the level of financial education 
on the subject of integration. Studies show that those respondents who feel better 
informed are more likely to be in favour of the full EMU membership. Access to infor-
mation is not the only important determinant – an important role is played by trust 
in the EMU institutions, in particular the European Central Bank. (Osińska, 2013). 
Eurobarometer studies show an increase in support for the euro since 2017: but 
over 50 per cent of young, uneducated and less informed Poles are against the euro. 
An evolution in the attitude of the entrepreneurs can also be observed – in 2018, 
74 per cent of those managing medium and large enterprises were in favour of the 
common currency. However, the level of support fluctuated substantially in the 
IN FAVOUR OF EURO 
ADOPTION
Polish 
People’s 
Party
Civic PlatformNowoczesna
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AGAINST EURO 
ADOPTION
years 2010-2016. In 2010, as much as 85 per cent of businessmen polled supported 
the euro. Five years later this percentage was only 42 per cent. Most recently the 
trend reversed again, as a result of a better economic performance in the euro area 
and the completion of the reform programs in peripheral Member States, namely 
Ireland and Portugal (Thorton, 2018).
Among the Polish political parties only Nowoczesna is unequivocally in favour 
of adopting the common currency as soon as possible. The Law and Justice Prime 
Minister Mateusz Morawiecki has highlighted that in his view adopting the euro 
is not currently beneficial for Poland – a higher level of convergence needs to be 
attained first (Forbes, 2019).  
Analysis of the probability of the euro being  
introduced in Poland by 2030 
Poland could fulfil all the convergence criteria needed to lift the derogation – both 
those which arise from the EU Treaties and the soft ones which have been intro-
duced since the financial crisis – within two years after a political decision to adopt 
euro will be made. The euro adoption requires however an amendment of the Polish 
Constitution, which requires a 2/3 majority of supporters in the Sejm and an ab-
solute majority in the Senate. Without a commitment to introduce these changes 
pursuing all the other criteria could be destabilising to the Polish economy. Given 
the determination of the euro's opponents among the Polish electorate and the par-
liamentary majority of euro-sceptical parties, such a policy change is highly unlikely. 
In particular in the foreseen parliamentary elections – 2019, 2023 and 2027 • the 
share of eurosceptic MPs is unlikely to fall below 33 per cent which effectively would 
mean the default scenario is that Poland will not pursue full EMU membership in 
the near future. This scenario could be different if the economic and fiscal position 
of euro area Member States visibly improves and the EMU reform is convincingly 
pursued. Changes in the attitudes of citizens vis-à-vis the euro could be spurred by 
an increase in the costs arising from delaying the decision to integrate with the euro 
area, as well as a public debate supported by financial education. 
Polish 
People’s 
Party
Law&Justice Kukiz'15
2.  Costs 
of delaying  
euro 
adoption 
Membership of the euro area is associated with a number of costs and benefits which 
are measurable, i.e. quantifiable in money terms, and non-measurable, influenc-
ing Poland’s political position in the international arena. Some of these costs are 
absolute and will materialise in similar magnitude regardless of the degree of in-
tegration with the euro area at the moment of adoption of the common currency, 
the institutional factors, EURPLN conversion rate or the phase of the business cy-
cle. Other costs are strictly determined by such factors, and can be conceived of as 
risks – events which may, but do not have to materialise. Below we outline the costs 
that would be incurred by Poland as a result of delaying the decision to introduce 
the euro – in the first place these are the costs which are certain and measurable, 
second those which are potential, and finally those which are not measurable, in-
cluding political in nature.
Measurable costs
Higher transaction costs arising from currency exchange
Most studies point to higher transaction costs of currency exchange incurred by 
households and enterprises as the most obvious cost resulting from delaying euro 
adoption (Narodowy Bank Polski, 2009; Rosati, 2013). These would disappear from 
one day to the next if the złoty was replaced by the common currency. Such costs 
are of two types.
The first category concerns costs which arise from currency risk, i.e. the risk 
of exchange rate (FX) fluctuations affecting the value of transaction in national cur-
rency. Most of Polish entrepreneurs – especially those which are part of global and 
European value chains – denominate their transactions in or index their products 
to the euro. In effect, in 2014 the euro (EUR) and the złoty (PLN) played a similar 
role in the currency structure of Polish exports – 33.8 per cent transactions were 
done in PLN, while 33.7 per cent in EUR. Similarly for imports – the euro was used 
in 31.3 per cent of all transactions, the złoty in 30.4 per cent with the dollar in third 
place at 16.7 per cent.
NBP’s surveys reveal that in 2013 circa 20 per cent of all exporter enterprises 
did not have a balanced currency transaction account (Puchalska and Tymoczko, 
2013). To protect themselves from destabilising fluctuations in revenue arising 
from FX fluctuations, entrepreneurs have to purchase costly financial instru-
ments, such as forward contracts, swaps and currency options. Already in 2008 
such instruments were used by 44 per cent of firms that received payments in eu-
ros, while the costs of insurance and currency adjustments accounted for 0.17 per 
cent of their annual turnover. In the large firms sector the cost amounted to PLN 
5.5 bn annually (Puchalska, 2008). It should be noted, however, that the misuse 
or misselling of financial derivatives can generate additional costs for exporters 
– this was the case of Polish enterprises buying and issuing currency options in 
2009 (Dobrowolski, 2017).
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With regard to terms of trade, the effect of adopting the euro would not only 
mean the immediate use of domestic currency for two thirds of international trans-
actions at current rates. The experience of the euro area Member States shows that 
after monetary integration also those transactions previously concluded in another 
global currency such as the dollar, were converted to euro (Ministerstwo Finansów, 
2010). This means that in addition to the euro-denominated trade being done in 
domestic currency after joining the eurozone, a substantial part of trade payments 
settled in dollars would be converted to euro as well (20 per cent of Polish trade 
balance). In the EU roughly 50 per cent of trade with third countries is denominat-
ed in euro (Draghi, 2019). This may only increase as the eurozone seeks to further 
strengthen the international role of the euro.
A second type of transaction cost which exists as a result of delaying the decision 
to adopt the euro arises from banking commissions and fees as well as administra-
tive expenses. These can be categorised further into two groups: the cost of currency 
exchange and costs arising from transferring funds between countries within and 
outside the euro area. In recent years the commission for exchanging PLN to EUR 
charged by banks (i.e. the spread) steadily increased and amounted to over 2.5 per 
cent of the transaction value (Grudziński, 2017). At the same time, however, with 
the development of fintech companies and internet currency exchanges, where the 
margins are much lower than in banks, the average transaction costs of currency 
AVERAGE BANK SPREADS FOR EURPLN EXCHANGE  
Source: Grudziński (2017).
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exchange are steadily decreasing. However, at this point there is no reliable data 
on the market structure of bank and non-bank currency exchange, especially for 
enterprises. 
When it comes to costs of transferring money, in 2018 the average fees for ATM 
withdrawal from a Polish account inside the euro area ranged between 0.30 and 2.37 
euro (per 10 euro withdrawal), while the costs of bank transfer from a Polish to a euro 
area account were on average 1.19 euro for a 10 euro transfer and 50 euro for sending 
10,000 euros (European Commission, 2018). If Poland were to join the euro area, these 
costs would be immediately eliminated in accordance with EU regulations.
In 2010 the government estimated the costs arising in Polish foreign trade trans-
actions settled in euro at 1-1.5 per cent GDP (Pełnomocnik Rządu ds. Wprowadze-
nia Euro przez Rzeczpospolitą Polską, 2010). More conservative calculations were 
presented by Rosati (2013), who estimated the costs at 0.5 per cent GDP in 2011. 
Taking into account the fact that the daily average of net transaction value for cur-
rency exchange between banks and non-financial institutions in 2017 amounted 
to PLN 2.1 bn, two thirds of which arose in the context of exchanging złoty to the 
euro (Narodowy Bank Polski, 2018), we can estimate that the cost resulting from 
FX spreads amounted to no more than 0.4 per cent of GDP. Adding the costs of se-
curitising currency risk and fees imposed on money transfers from and to the euro 
area, we estimate the transaction costs of delayed euro adoption at circa 0.7 per 
cent of GDP per annum.
It should be noted, however, that the two categories of transaction costs present-
ed above constitute – at least in part – the income of the domestic financial sector. 
Adopting the euro by Poland will therefore mean a decrease in income of domestic 
banks and other financial institutions (e.g. currency exchanges), and therefore ac-
celerate lay-offs in this part of the economy. The remaining decrease in revenue will 
be incurred by monetary financial institutions outside of Poland. It is impossible 
to determine the precise distribution of such revenue loss between domestic and 
foreign institutions, consequently we cannot estimate the decrease in income of the 
domestic banking sector after monetary integration is concluded.
Higher interest rates for the private sector
From a macroeconomic point of view, the most significant difference between hav-
ing the euro and using a national currency materialises in the level of market inter-
est rates. As long as they remain outside of the common currency area, the actors 
in the Polish economy – households, enterprises and the public sector – all incur 
costs arising from high interest rates, which are currently some  of the highest in 
the EU (European Mortgage Federation, 2018).
Differences in interest rates arise from two factors. First, the NBP maintains 
higher reference interest rates than the ECB, which decides on the monetary policy 
for euro area countries. Second, market rates in Poland – as long as the country is 
not a full member of the EMU – are higher as a result of the risk premium. The risk 
premium is calculated on the basis of the liquidity of the capital market, currency 
volatility risk, as well as the predictability of inflation and stability of the domestic 
financial system (e.g. the currency reserves and banks’ own capital).  As a result 
of these factors, the difference in 3 month interbank rates in Poland and the euro 
area amounted to 2.03 percentage points at the end of 2018. If Poland adopted the 
euro, this difference would be eliminated.
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For existing mortgage and commercial loans this would imply automatic reduc-
tion in loan instalments , which are calculated on the basis of interbank market rates 
(i.e. WIBOR). banks would most likely seize part of this reduction arising from lower 
interest rates for themselves by increasing their margins. Consequently, we adopt 
a conservative estimate that only 75 per cent of the reduction of interest rates will 
be transferred onto customers and we calculate that the cost of delaying the decision 
to adopt the euro for households amounts to PLN 8.7 bn and for enterprises - PLN 
3.7 bn in 2018 (i.e. PLN 12.4 bn altogether). This amounts to 0.6 per cent of GDP.
The benefits for households and companies as a result of reduction in interest 
rates after joining the euro increase year by year as the Polish financial market de-
velops, more firms are engaged in global trade and the amount of loans (as a ratio 
to GDP) increases. For comparison, in 2013 Rosati estimated that the benefits for 
the private sector arising from a reduction in interest rates would amount to at 
most PLN 10 bn.    
Higher costs of servicing public debt
Yet another cost associated with delaying integration with the euro area, which is 
also directly the result of higher interest rates on the interbank market, arises from 
the higher costs of servicing public debt. When compared with interbank interest 
rates, the profitability of government bonds (on which the cost of servicing govern-
ment debt directly depends) is determined by a number of factors. In addition to 
the currency risk premium, the level of central bank interest rates, and the stability 
of the financial system, the interest rates on public debt are affected by the credit-
worthiness of a given country (so-called “rating”), the profitability of bonds in the 
largest euro area Member States or the US, as well as the debt management policy 
itself. In addition, as a result of the long average maturity of public bonds (4.5 years 
as of end of 2018), the benefits of reducing the profitability of government bonds 
will be distributed over time. 
From the perspective of financial markets, up until 2010 the euro area Member 
States were considered to have a low default risk, and as a result enjoyed a relative-
ly low cost of debt. According to IMF’s estimates (IMF, 2015) being outside of the 
euro area reduced bond profitability in the same way as raising S&P rating by two 
grades. However, the sovereign debt crisis in Greece and other periphery Member 
States of the euro area virtually eliminated the systematic differences in risk pre-
mia between euro and non-euro Member States. In the case of Poland, we can still 
anticipate a certain decrease in sovereign default risk premium as a result of lower 
risk of speculative attacks on the currency and given the high share of foreign-cur-
rency denominated public debt (30 per cent). The range of this decrease is not pos-
sible to estimate. We therefore somewhat conservatively assume, that a reduction 
in the sovereign default risk as reflected in bond profitability would not take place 
if euro is adopted.
Taking into account the above factors, to estimate how much higher the cost 
of servicing public debt is as long as Poland remains outside of the euro area, we 
must resort to a certain estimation, namely to calculate the discounted present val-
ue of the difference between annual expenditure on debt servicing of PLN denom-
inated debt and that arising from the cost of servicing euro denominated bonds (as 
of 25 February 2019 this different was on average 1.8 percentage points). According 
( t o t a l 12.4 PLN).
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to our calculations, the cost of delaying integration arising from servicing public 
debt would amount to PLN 7.4 bn in 2019, i.e. 0.3 per cent of GDP. By comparison in 
2008, the finance ministry estimated that such savings would amount to PLN 6.1 bn 
per annum, including 1 bn saved as a result of Poland’s improved creditworthiness 
(Pełnomocnik Rządu ds. Wprowadzenia Euro przez Rzeczpospolitą Polską, 2010).
The size of this cost of delaying euro adoption should remain stable in relation 
to GDP over the next decade due to the fixed ratio of euro-denominated debt to 
GDP and a generally stable over time yield spread of Polish PLN and EUR sovereign 
bonds. In addition, EMU reforms introduced after the financial crisis proved that 
the euro Member States are determined to protect the credibility and the irrever- 
sibility of the common currency, which should not result in a higher risk premium 
for countries that are part of the euro area.
Potential costs
Slower increase in exports
The free movement of goods and services encompasses the entire European Union. 
However, some scholars (Eichengreen and Bayoumi, 1993; Frankel and Rose, 1998; 
Grauwe, 2000; Rosati, 2013) show that membership in a common currency area 
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further facilitates trade integration (the so-called Rose effect). Barriers to trade 
arising between countries maintaining different currencies emerge principally from 
higher transaction costs already discussed above as well as a higher risk from estab-
lishing long-term business relations. Eliminating the currency exchange volatility 
risk means more predictability in business. In addition, with the adoption of a more 
credible currency, export to third countries increases as well.
In 1990s it was estimated (Frankel and Rose, 1998) that adopting the common 
currency could increase exports by 10-54 per cent. NBP estimates showed that in 
the case of Poland, exports would be 12.9 per cent higher, while imports would be 
9.2 per cent higher if Poland adopted the euro (Daras and Hagemejer, 2009). A little 
over half of this effect (7 per cent and 5.6 per cent, respectively) arises from the de-
crease in the transaction costs alone. The remaining increase would be a result of the 
reduction in the risk premium priced at market interest rates, equal to 1 percentage 
point. Interestingly, the effect on exports and imports would vary over time. In the 
first quarters after the adoption of the common currency imports would be expected 
to rise – this would negatively affect GDP. Only in the longer term – once the new 
business links are established, production capacity increases and the inflation sta-
bilizes –would benefits from the higher exports materialise and induce higher GDP.
Experience of euro area countries provides evidence that different scenarios for 
export and import dynamics can occur after monetary integration. Germany has be-
nefited the most from the creation of the euro area experiencing an increase in go-
ods exports, while Luxembourg and Austria have increased their exports of services. 
A much higher increase in imports than exports after euro integration was observed 
in the peripheral countries – from Ireland, where the scale of goods exports has de-
creased significantly in relation to GDP, through Finland which became the principal 
importer of services, all the way to Spain, where the ratio of both services and goods 
exports to GDP decreased.
Source: Eurostat, own calculations.
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More recent publications (Baldwin, 2006; IMF, 2015; Festoc, 2017; Algebris Pol-
icy & Research Forum, 2018; Gąska and Kawalec, 2018; Mika and Zymek, 2018) 
have shown that the balance of benefits from trade integration could be overesti-
mated, for example by overemphasizing benefits stemming from the risk premium 
reduction and from exports increases, if the loss of competitiveness by euro area 
Member States is not appropriately taken into account. In addition, the magni-
tude of benefits decreases with time, with economic development and an increase 
in trade interconnectedness within the European Union as a whole (Rose, 2017). 
As a result, we consider it necessary to adopt a somewhat more conservative as-
sumptions than those proposed in 2009. First, as studies of the International Mon-
etary Fund show (IMF, 2015), we should not expect a significant reduction of risk 
premium after Poland adopts the euro. If this decrease materializes, it will be too 
small to materially affect the economy. Second, the scale of benefits from mone-
tary integration for trade decreases over time, since an increase in trade will take 
place in any case. This means that the main cost of delaying euro area adoption for 
exporters is a delay in wider access to global value chains allowing for increase in 
their market share.
Slower increase in investment and consumption
The above-described effects of delaying euro adoption have an indirect impact not 
only on the dynamics of imports, but also on the rate of increase in investment out-
lays and consumption (Narodowy Bank Polski, 2009). The literature on this topic 
distinguishes at least five mechanisms through which integration with a currency 
union translates into higher internal demand:
Lower interest rates after joining the euro should stimulate enterprises and house-
holds to take credit, increasing investment and consumption (Pełnomocnik Rządu 
ds. Wprowadzenia Euro przez Rzeczpospolitą Polską, 2010)
Lower transaction costs, lower interest rates and lower currency risk should 
stimulate the development of the Polish capital market, and by consequence 
increase entrepreneurs’ access to capital (Pełnomocnik Rządu ds. Wprowadze-
nia Euro przez Rzeczpospolitą Polską, 2010). Slower development of the capital 
market outside of the euro area translates into lower choice of investment  
products available to firms, such as corporate eurobonds (Bernoth et al., 2019).
Monetary integration facilitates faster financial integration, which increases 
banking sector capacity to provide credit for investment and spending 
 (Narodowy Bank Polski, 2009).
Lower transaction costs and FX risk should result in higher inflows of foreign 
direct investment (FDI), especially from other euro area Member States. 
According to some estimates, after joining the euro, FDI inflow to Poland could 
increase by 18.5 per cent (Brouwer, Paap and Viaene, 2008). 
As a result of multiplier and supply effects, employment and productivity should 
increase (Bukowski, Dyrda and Kowal, 2008), leading to a faster wage growth. 
This will additionally stimulate consumption expenditures.
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A good example of the various effects that adopting the euro could lead to are the 
development paths of Portugal’s and Ireland’s GDP dynamics after 2001. In both 
countries there was a significant increase in consumption – in Ireland the increase 
in household consumption contributed an additional 16 percentage points to GDP 
growth between 2001 and 2007, in Portugal  6 percentage points. However, it was 
only Ireland that took euro adoption as an opportunity to increase investment. As 
a result, the share of contribution of investment to Irish GDP growth equalled to 14 
percentage points, while in Portugal this contribution was negative (sic!) and total-
led -2 percentage points. Such crowding out of investment by consumption and an 
increase in public spending meant that Portugal was not able to regain international 
competitiveness after the global economic crisis kicked in and that – between 2007 
and 2017 – the real GDP of that country almost did not change, while the Irish eco-
nomy cumulatively increased by 49 per cent.
THE STRUCTURE OF GDP GROWTH IN 2001-2007 VS. CHANGE IN GDP IN 2007-2017
Source: Eurostat,  own calculations.
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side of domestic demand, they will have a temporary effect and – in the worst sce-
nario – could even destabilize the economy (see: potential benefits from delaying 
integration). 
No participation in ECB profits
Each central bank generates profits originating from currency issuance and man-
aging the reserve portfolio. Poland after joining the euro will get access to ECB 
profits proportionally to its share in the bank’s capital. This share should be equal 
to the one of the Dutch central bank (currently 5.8 per cent). If Poland was a mem-
ber of the euro area in 2018, the NBP would receive an additional PLN 322 mn 
from the PLN 6.8 bn profit generated by the ECB. 95 per cent of this profit would 
be transferred to the state budget, raising non-tax revenue.  At the same time, the 
NBP would lose part of the profit it generates from managing the reserve portfo-
lio, which would be immediately reduced by all the euro area denominated assets 
– these would become a part of the Eurosystem money supply. According to our 
calculations, the combined positive impact of monetary integration on the non-tax 
budget revenues will not exceed 0.1 per cent of GDP.
Non-measurable costs
Higher social and political risk resulting from FX  
denominated or indexed mortgage loans 
An additional benefit of adopting the euro by Poland is a significant reduction of po-
litical risk, and as a result risk of financial sector instability, connected to mortgage 
loans issued before 2013 in foreign currencies (later the availability of such loans 
was reduced due to the S recommendation issued by the Polish Financial Services 
Authority and EU regulations). By adopting the euro, currency risk will be fully 
removed from euro-denominated/indexed loans. Swiss franc (CHF) denominat-
ed/indexed loans will also be exposed to lower risk for two reasons. First, the EU-
RCHF exchange rate has been more stable over time as compared to the CHFPLN 
exchange rate. Second, within the euro area the Polish banking sector will have 
much easier and cheaper access to securitisation of  Swiss franc loan portfolio. 
Consequently, even when faced with a mandatory redenomination of loans, banks 
within the euro area would incur lower losses and enjoy higher financial stability. 
Higher susceptibility to speculative attacks and risk of crises
The original architecture of the euro area foresaw only common monetary policy. 
Contrary to the vision of EMU’s architects including Tomasso Padoa-Schioppa 
(2005), oversight over the banking sector, i.e. micro and macroprudential policies, 
remained at national discretion. The financial crisis and the crisis of sovereign debt 
in some of the euro area countries spurred fundamental reforms of the EMU insti-
tutional architecture. The creation of the Banking Union and strengthening of the 
competences of the ECB as a financial supervisior are intended to ensure financial 
stability in the euro area as a whole. Centralised oversight already allowed for more 
decisive action oriented at limiting risk in the banking sector arising from faulty 
management or illegal activity, such as money laundering.
Financial supervision in the euro area consists of crises-preventing mechanisms 
and a set of safety nets for the event of financial sector distress in one or more 
eurozone countries. An example of the latter is the second pillar of the Banking 
Union, namely the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM). The SRM has at its disposal 
the Single Resolution Fund amounting to EUR 50 bn, which is now guaranteed by 
a credit line from the European Stability Mechanism, which has firepower of EUR 
500 bn. The fund is accessible to all euro area banks. The EU is still working on cre-
ating a common deposit guarantee fund.
While outside of the euro area, Poland is not part of these institutions – this 
decreases the credibility of its financial sector (IMF, 2015; Belke et al., 2016) and 
increases the susceptibility of the country to speculative attacks. In this respect, re-
maining outside of  the euro area is more worrisome, as the share of euro-denominat-
ed or indexed assets in the balance sheets of Polish financial institutions increases 
with EU-wide integration of bank and capital markets.  As a result, a sudden depre- 
ciation of the domestic currency caused by a speculative attack or a fiscal crisis could 
dry up the capital market, induce bank insolvency or lead to a stock market crash. 
As estimated by Czerniak et al. (2019) membership in the euro area significantly 
reduces the risk of stock market bubbles. 
Additionally, as a fallout of the eurozone sovereign debt crisis new institutions were 
established to provide financial aid for governments in fiscal distress. The ultimate re-
covery mechanism is the ESM. It was established to assist Member States in times 
of economic or financial crises and to enable the restoration of financial stability. As 
the experience of non-euro area Member States (e.g. Hungary or Romania) indicates, 
access to such backstops has important implications for the cost of crises. Currently 
non-euro area countries are supported only by a much smaller – and much less flexi-
ble – Balance of Payments instrument established by EU Treaties (Art. 143 TFEU), the 
firepower of which was only recently raised to EUR 50 bn (Alcidi et al., 2017). Alterna-
tively, non-euro area Member States have to rely on support from the International 
Monetary Fund (as was the case of Poland in 2009 when a flexible credit line with the 
IMF was established for eight years at a total cost of almost PLN 2 bn). IMF programs 
bear a substantially higher burden, which includes stiffer institutional conditionality 
and higher interest payments, than the ESM support. As a consequence, by delaying 
accession to the euro area Poland forgoes access to the financial safety net protecting 
against speculative attacks and cushioning against the consequences of fiscal crises.
No access to the euro area budget
After much discussion, a budgetary instrument for the euro area is now foreseen 
in the Multiannual Financial Framework 2021-2027. In the initial stages it is likely 
to remain relatively small (European Commission’s 2018 proposal foresee a mere 
EUR 25 bn over the seven year period). Therefore the opportunity cost of forego-
ing access to this fund directly – even if its creation entails a reallocation from the 
overall EU budget – for Poland would be small. 
In the long run, a higher cost of delaying euro area membership will include the 
inability to shape this budget and participate in the discussion on what function 
it would serve. As of winter 2019, the possibilities considered include establishing 
the budget with a view to supporting reforms increasing competitiveness and con-
vergence in the euro area countries or introducing fiscal stabilisers (such as unem-
ployment benefits). Although non-euro area Member States are participating in the 
discussion (for example by supporting the Netherlands, reluctant to any risk-shar-
ing instruments), they are not directly involved in the the process of designing the 
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budget nor in the creation of its conceptual framework. Limited participation in 
this debate, taking also into account the ideological disputes underpinning the on-
going EMU reform (Brunnermeier, James and Landau, 2016), is yet another cost 
of delaying the adoption of the common currency.
Limited influence over the political decisions  
concerning the European Union’s future
EU Treaties foresee a separate decision-making structure for euro area Member States 
(Orłowski et al., 2019). For example, the voting rights of Member States enjoying a tem-
porary derogation from full EMU membership are suspended during votes in the 
Council of the EU which concern the general direction of euro area economic policies, 
nomination of Governing Council members of the ECB, decisions concerning common 
positions in international organisations as well as those decisions that refer to sanctions 
imposed as part of the dedicated Excessive Deficit Procedure (Art. 139 TFEU). 
Since the crisis, an even more important role has been played by the Eurogroup 
– an informal grouping of ministers of finance of the euro area, since 2017 chaired 
by the Portuguese Finance Minister Mario Canteno (Braun, Hübner and Hoff-
mann-Axthelm, 2019). It is at the Eurogroup meetings that the key decisions con-
cerning the future shape of the euro area are taken. Since these meetings often 
precede the meetings of the EU Finance Ministers (EcoFin), they are used as a plat-
form for euro area Member States to coin their common position in further nego- 
tiations with non-eurozone countries. Yet another institution which is only attended by 
the euro area Member States are Euro Summits. Lack of representation in these meet-
ings means limited impact over the prospective far-reaching EU policies, in particular 
the social dimension of the EMU, including labour market reforms (Juncker et al., 2015). 
Finally, with the euro area budget close to materialising, calls for the creation of a sepa-
rate chamber for euro area representatives will return (Funke and Guttenberg, 2019). 
In addition to the limited influence over the shaping of EMU institutions, 
non-euro Member States are prevented from participating in decisions which shape 
the international role of the euro as a reserve currency, such as the proposal to cre-
ate a separate euro area payment system as an alternative to SWIFT (Draghi, 2019). 
These are likely to accelerate under the new ECB president Christine Lagarde. On 
a more general level, the costs of delaying the decision to adopt the euro encompass 
a lower impact on future EU institutional architecture.
Important decisions on macroprudential issues are taken in the ECB. The Trea-
ties foresee no representation for non-euro area members in the governing bodies 
of the ECB (Art. 139 TFEU). Even in pan-EU oversight institutions, such as the 
European Systemic Risk Board, meetings are increasingly taken in a restrictive eu-
rozone format at working group level. Such an exclusion results from the fact that 
the representatives of national euro area supervisors consider financial instability 
in the euro area a separate issue from that of financial instability in the multi-cur-
rency internal market. This restricts the influence of non-euro area governments 
on technical financial regulations already at the early stages of the decision-mak-
ing process. Furthermore, ECB oversight extends over banks, which have Polish 
subsidiaries, which gives the bank indirect influence on the functioning of Polish 
banks (Belke et al., 2016). As a result, delaying the adoption of the euro implies 
a limited incorporation of Polish local-market specific concerns within the ECB 
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policy decision-making processes.
In most studies about euro adoption in Poland it is argued that delaying monetary 
integration is costly as it postpones the advancement to a higher trajectory of eco-
nomic growth. When the research outcome implies a positive cost-benefit balance 
of euro adoption, than full as-soon-as-possible EMU membership is argued for as 
an imperative. In turn, in analyses which claim that the costs outweigh the bene-
fits of monetary integration, the question of delaying integration is omitted as it is 
argued that Poland should never join the common currency area. In contrast, we 
propose to introduce a dynamic analysis of the benefits of delaying euro adoption. 
Such an approach is justified by new research on the sovereign debt crisis in the 
eurozone and a change in Polish government’s policy after the 2015 parliamentary 
elections. Moreover, it is particularly necessary when one analyses the potential 
benefits of delayed euro adoption to the extent that a delay allows for preparation 
for monetary integration in terms of institutional soundness (Rapacki, 2015) and 
economic convergence (Czerniak et al., 2019). Such benefits arise principally from 
minimising the risk of following the Greek or Portuguese scenario of monetary in-
tegration in Poland.
Measurable benefits
Gradual decrease of real costs of integration 
According to NBP estimates from 2009 the approximate cost of introducing the 
euro to cash and cashless circulation in Poland would amount to PLN 20-23 bn, 
depending on the mechanism of integration (Narodowy Bank Polski, 2009). The 
most cost-effective would be a so-called Big Bang method, i.e. the exchange of all 
currency at the moment of euro adoption, while the least cost effective method 
would be temporarily keeping both currencies in circulation. However, the latter 
would minimise the negative social consequences as well as the so-called “cap-
puccino effect” (upward rounding-up of prices at the moment of conversion).
Four types of costs connected to introducing the euro into circulation can be 
distinguished. First, NBP expenses arising from the cost of printing new notes 
and disposal of the old ones, changes in the bank’s IT systems, adjusting sorters 
and other machines to the new currency as well as costs of public educational 
campaigns would total PLN 1.5-2 bn. Second, expenses in public administra-
tion arising from changes in legal acts, informational campaign and adjusting 
the public IT systems would cost PLN 0.9-1.1 bn. Third, costs of introducing the 
euro to circulation borne by banks (PLN 2.3-2.6 bn), which would have to change 
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ATMs, sorters and other machines, in addition to IT systems. Banks would also 
lose income from currency exchange operations and financial products securi-
tising the currency risk. Finally, the highest cost at the macro level is the finan-
cial burden of introducing the euro borne by enterprises (PLN 15.7-17 bn) – they 
will have to adjust their IT and accounting systems, as well as change their pric-
ing lists and product price tags. 
The real costs of introducing the euro decrease over time, due to the increas-
ing share of cashless payments, as well as the fixed real cost of exchanging the 
IT systems or printing new notes, and disposing of the old ones. We assume that 
while in 2009 the cost of exchanging the currency amounted to 1.6-1.8 per cent 
of GDP, in 2018 this cost would amount only to 1 per cent.
Potential benefits
Higher stability of economic growth 
 The main argument in favour of staying outside of the euro area is the autonomy 
of pursuing monetary policy (Kawalec and Pytlarczyk, 2016b). Independence is here 
understood as preventing a situation where the level of interest rates is badly adjusted 
to the economic situation in a given member state, in other words that interest rates 
are set at a level too low, leading to overheating of the economy, or too high - limiting 
growth and hindering investment activity. An element of an independent monetary 
policy is of course a flexible exchange rate, which can absorb domestic and foreign 
macroeconomic shocks. A majority of economists argue that it was the sudden depre-
ciation of the PLN which shielded Poland from recession in 2008/2009 – the country 
remained the only EU member state with positive GDP growth.
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ACTUAL AND COUNTERFACTUAL GDP  
IN THE SCENARIO OF POLAND ADOPTING EURO IN 2005
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In this context, however, we must differentiate between the phenomenon 
of business cycle volatility and an increase in the economic potential of a given 
country. The public debate on benefits of independent monetary policy and flexible 
FX rates is usually narrowed down to crisis period analysis. This is a gross oversim-
plification, as independent monetary policy slows down GDP growth due to cur-
rency appreciation and higher interest rates at the peak of the economic cycle. As 
a result, a faulty conclusion is drawn that keeping domestic currency can increase 
the economic potential over the long term, while the actual impact of independent 
monetary policy on long-term potential GDP growth is close to zero. According to 
the study by Brzoza-Brzezina et al. (2012) Polish GDP would be 13 per cent higher 
at the peak of the economic cycle (III quarter of 2008) and 10 per cent lower at the 
trough (IV quarter of 2009) if Poland had adopted the euro in 2005. Moreover, Pol-
ish GDP would be roughly the same with and without euro at the end of the global 
financial crisis (IV quarter 2011).
Differences between business cycle volatility in countries with a fixed and a flexible 
exchange rate mechanism can be observed in the diverging experience of Latvia 
(fixed exchange rate against the euro since 2005, joined the eurozone in 2014) 
and Iceland (flexible exchange rate throughout the whole decade) over the course 
of the crisis. The range of GDP increase experienced by these countries between 
2004 and 2015 is similar (28.4 and 28.8 per cent, respectively), but Latvia noted 
a 11.4 percentage point higher GDP growth rate during the pre-crisis boom and a 4.3 
percentage point higher growth during the post-crisis rebound, while being subject 
thad adopted during the global crisis itself.
Source: Eurostat, own calculations.
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Finally, it should be noted that research does not confirm the stabilising effects 
of independent monetary policy on the Polish business cycle. According to some 
economists, since the 2000s the weakening of the PLN negatively impacted GDP 
growth (Arratibel and Michaelis, 2014) at the same time contributing to higher in-
come inequalities (Cravino and Levchenko, 2015). The positive effects of depreci-
ation meanwhile are proven to materialise only partly and with a significant delay 
(Demian and di Mauro, 2017). In addition, other studies argue that the effective 
NBP independence is rather limited due to a high interdependence between Pol-
ish and euro area capital markets (Gabrisch, 2017) and due to the ongoing financial 
globalisation (Rey, 2013).
Therefore, it is impossible to precisely estimate the amplifying impact of euro 
membership on cyclical fluctuations of the economy and a decrease in the resilience 
of the economy to shocks. However, we can determine that the scale of fluctuations 
after the euro is adopted will be dependent on policies which would still remain in 
the hands of national institutions, namely fiscal and macroprudential. Through 
the use of a number of instruments (tax rates, social transfers, public investment, 
capital buffers, loan to income rations, etc.) the amplitude of cyclical fluctuations 
after euro adoption may be limited (Kosior and Rubaszek, 2014). This is all the more 
warranted in the case of countries such as Poland, which, compared to Iceland and 
Latvia, have a larger domestic market. 
Higher competitiveness of the economy
The Polish economy - much like any other country on the path of real convergence 
– is characterised by higher wage dynamics than average in wealthier euro area 
countries, and therefore a relatively higher inflation rate. This is known as the 
Balassa-Samuelson effect, well covered in the literature (Boratyński et al., 2019a), 
which EMU membership amplifies. This effect can cause a sudden drop in inter-
national competitiveness after euro adoption – as experienced by the peripheral 
EMU countries.
Estimates suggest that as a result of the Balassa-Samuelson effect between 1995-
2010 inflation in Poland was 3.3 percentage points higher per annum than in the 
euro area member states – that is 28 per cent of the total difference in inflation lev-
els between Poland and EMU (Konopczak and Welfe, 2017). This effect was much 
lower in other Visegrad countries and amounted to 2.2-2.5 percentage points per 
annum. In addition, the same study shows that the very structure of the Polish econ-
omy, i.e. high and non-progressive wage tax, high level of natural unemployment 
and inelastic labour market, means that the higher wage growth feeds directly into 
inflation, but also that this effect is magnified by second round effects (recursive 
impact of inflation on wage dynamics). A 0.4 percentage point difference between 
inflation levels in Poland and the euro area arises as a result of the institutional 
structure of the domestic economy – this scale being much higher than in other 
Visegrad countries.
While over the next years the magnitude of the Balassa-Samuelson effect in Po-
land will decrease as a result of further real convergence and a decrease in structural 
unemployment, it will nonetheless remain most likely higher than in Southern euro 
area Member States after they had joined the EMU – 1.8 percentage point in Spain, 
1.2 percentage point in Greece and 1.1 percentage point in Portugal. The corollary of 
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this is that, premature euro adoption implies a high risk that the ECB interest rates 
will be too low for the Polish economy, facilitating its overheating and subsequent 
loss of competitiveness.
Scholars argue that a country which has lost its competitiveness and is a member 
of a common currency area, could experiences significant difficulties in regaining 
it (Kawalec and Pytlarczyk, 2016a; Gąska and Kawalec, 2018). Lack of a flexible ex-
change rate means that policy makers cannot restore the price competitiveness 
of exports though currency depreciation. Rather, the country has to implement the 
politically and socially costly internal devaluation, that is to enter into a long-term 
process of wage and price decreases. This may cause a deep recession and a fiscal 
crisis, especially in countries which had not carried out restrictive fiscal policies 
in times of prosperity. This risk is magnified by the increased amplitude of cyclical 
fluctuations, which are an intrinsic feature of currency union membership. This is 
in particular the case for economies with inelastic labour markets, where periods 
Consequences of the loss of international competiveness arising from the Balassa- 
-Samuelson effect within a common currency area can be observed by comparing 
the changes in nominal unit labour costs in Germany and Spain after the euro area 
was created. Between 2001-2008 these remained stable in Germany, while in Spain 
they rose by 29 per cent. This caused a loss of competitiveness of the latter eco-
nomy and a significant lowering of the international balance in trade of goods and 
services - by 2.8 percentage points of GDP. Simultaneously the German trade sur-
plus improved by 4.3 percentage points.
Source: Eurostat, own calculations.
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of deep recession may lead to hysteresis effects (i.e. sustained high unemployment 
even after business sentiment improves). As a result, low dynamics of potential 
GDP persist over an extended period of time, stemming economic recovery.
There are several ways to reduce the risk of long-term loss of competitiveness 
at the point of entry into a common currency area. These include higher GDP con-
vergence, implementing a responsible, non-populist fiscal policy and structural 
reforms of the labour market oriented at reducing the tax wedge and improving 
the mobility of the labour force (Kosior and Rubaszek, 2014). Such institutional 
Differences between a permanent loss of price competitiveness and a quick 
adjustment of the level of wages and prices can be observed by comparing Greece 
and Ireland after the global financial crisis. The recessions in both countries 
were comparable (5 per cent in Ireland and 4.3 per cent in Greece). However, 
the Irish economy responded quite flexibly – already in 2009 the prices of goods 
and services (measured by GDP deflator) decreased by 4.4 per cent, and in the 
following years dropped by a cumulative 9.2 percent – while in Greece prices rose 
well into 2011 and only a deepening recession and unemployment surpassing 
20 per cent forced an internal devaluation and a consecutive improvement in 
international competitiveness. Such low flexibility of the economy, in particular in 
the labour market, meant Greece was unable to quickly regain its competitiveness 
to pre-crisis levels. 
Source: Eurostat, own calculations.
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adjustments enable the restoration of lost competitiveness with a correction of wag-
es and prices. They allow for accelerated economic growth, without the risk of hys-
teresis effects or political or fiscal crises. Furthermore, from this perspective the 
EURPLN conversion rate is very important: it should include a security buffer for 
inflation increases resulting from the Balassa-Samuelson effect. Adopting the euro 
at a too high conversion rate would force an immediate internal adjustment, trans-
lating into lower economic growth.    
Limited risk of a price bubble on the real estate market
A high level of convergence in terms of living standards is considered to be one 
of the conditions for the proper functioning of currency areas. If Poland continues 
to grow at a higher pace than Western countries, delaying the decision to join the 
euro area would mean that adoption of the common currency would take place 
between economies at a more similar level of development. Convergence in living 
costs would further lower the risk of a house market bubble (Stążka-Gawrysia, 2011; 
Czerniak et al., 2019). Countries with a low share of rental housing, such as Ireland, 
Spain and Poland (Czerniak and Rubaszek, 2018) or those with unfavourable cultur-
al endowment (Czerniak and Witkowski, 2016) are particularly exposed to this risk.
The proneness to housing bubbles can be curtailed by introducing the right ma- 
croprudential policy (Rubio and Comunale, 2016) which decreases the risk of an 
excessive increase in credit availability after euro adoption, and thus prevents the 
financial accelerator mechanism from kicking in. In other words, macroprudential 
tools can limit the supply of mortgage credit resulting from an increase in real estate 
prices and the consequent improvement of bank’s capital requirements (Bernanke, 
Gertler and Gilchrist, 1999). The most commonly used instruments are loan-to-val-
ue and debt-to-income requirements, as well as higher capital buffers for banks in 
Source: Eurostat, own calculations.
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times of favourable business conditions and rapid real estate price growth. Since 
2014 the ESRB publishes a register of macroprudential policies introduced by diffe- 
rent Member States oriented at reducing the destabilising fluctuations in access 
to capital. Macroprudential policies are typically introduced by national author-
ities – this is the case also for the countries which are members of the euro area. 
Banking Union likewise is oriented at reducing instabilities in the Union financial 
markets. As a result, joining the Banking Union – obligatory for euro area countries 
– should reduce the risk of a price bubble on the Polish real estate market (Kosior 
and Rubaszek, 2014). 
No temporary increase in inflation due to  
rounding up of prices
One of the most common arguments against the adoption of the euro by Poland ap-
pearing in the public debate is that it will cause an increase in prices at the moment 
of currency conversion. In popular opinion the prices will be converted 1-1, or – in 
the best case scenario – simply rounded up. Studies of current members of the euro 
area show that these worries are exaggerated since an increase in prices – though it 
may materialise – is usually much smaller than anticipated. In the case of the Neth-
erlands, for example, it was anticipated that the increase could amount to as much 
as 0.9 per cent, while in reality it barely reached 0.3 per cent.
The possible increase in prices which may materialise as a result of rounding up 
ranges from 0 per cent if enterprises will round up prices arithmetically, to as much 
as 0.6 per cent if they will round up the attractive (e.g. 4.99 PLN) or psychological 
(e.g. 3.50 PLN) prices to the closest attractive or psychological upward price (re-
spectively, 1.49 euro and 1 euro) (Rozkrut, Jakubik and Konopczak, 2009). Which 
of these scenarios materialises depends on the method of introducing the euro into 
circulation (Big Bang or a gradual conversion), what price tagging mechanism will 
be introduced (e.g. whether an obligation to provide prices in both złoty and euro 
would be introduced) and how successful the information campaign on currency 
conversion will be. Also the actual conversion rate will be a major factor in deter-
mining integration-driven inflation. From this perspective the most favourable 
conversion rate would be a whole number (e.g. 3 or 4 PLN), and the least favourable 
a conversion rate with two decimal places right before the psychological conver-
sion rate (e.g. 4.49 PLN) – the differences in the impact of the actual conversion 
rate on inflation can reach as much as 2 percentage points (Rozkrut, Jakubik and 
Konopczak, 2009).
Non-measurable benefits
Resilience to future euro area crises
One of the costs of monetary integration often invoked by those who remain 
sceptical to the euro, is the potential participation of Poland in the cost of rescue 
of other euro area member states and higher susceptibility to crisis spillovers across 
the common currency area, i.a. via increased public debt servicing costs. Poland 
would most likely have to participate in the bail-out programs of insolvent states, 
and – in the event of euro area break-up – it may incur losses resulting from Target2 
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settlements between central banks (Whelan, 2017). The scale of these costs and the 
probability of them materialising is impossible to estimate. Further, even staying 
outside of the euro area Poland bears at least part of these costs as a result of the 
scale of financial and trade integration within the European Union (Stoupos and 
Kiohos, 2017).
Greater independence of state economic policy
Euro area institutions restrict the possibility of pursuing and independent eco-
nomic policy by EMU Member States. In particular, after the sovereign debt crisis 
in some member states, decision-making over national budgets within the EMU 
became more coordinated, with greater influence of Union institutions over the 
national budgets of euro area countries.  New regulations not only forbid euro area 
Member States from accumulating excessive macroeconomic imbalances, but also 
In countries which adopted the euro after the global financial crisis, a small incre-
ase in prices as a result of currency conversion could be observed. An acceleration 
of inflation as compared to the average increase in price dynamics in the 19 EMU 
countries materialised only in Latvia (0.9 percentage points), while in Slovakia and 
Estonia an acceleration in price increases was observed before the derogation was 
lifted, which could have been the result of an early adjustment of prices. In Lithu-
ania, which was the last country to join the euro, the inflation rate at the moment 
of accession visibly declined.
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN MONTHLY INFLATION RATES IN A GIVEN COUNTRY AND THE EA19 AVERAGE 
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strengthen the sanction mechanisms which can be employed with regard to countries which 
have an irresponsible economic policy (e.g. fines can be imposed on countries which do not 
meet budgetary targets). Even greater restrictions on the economic policy stance are imposed 
on countries which are covered by Assistance Programmes (Greece, Ireland, Portugal) – which 
are required by the ECB and euro area finance ministers to implement restrictive fiscal policy 
(Varoufakis, 2018). Countries outside of the euro area have greater freedom in shaping their 
economic policy, in particular with regard to social benefits.
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4.  Balance 
of costs and 
benefits 
of delaying 
euro 
adoption
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Previous research on monetary integration that provides a cost-benefit analysis has 
taken a number of benefits of adopting the E for granted (Narodowy Bank Polski, 
2009; Pełnomocnik Rządu ds. Wprowadzenia Euro przez Rzeczpospolitą Polską, 
2010; Rosati, 2013). Another strand of literature encompasses primarily the unmea-
surable or potential consequences of adopting the euro, with a special focus on its 
political aspects (Kolodko, 2017; Orłowski et al., 2019). The literature lacunae we 
have identified was a complex and dynamic cost-benefit analysis of delaying mon-
etary integration, including measurable, potential and non-measurable effects. For 
the sake of filling this gap, below we present the balance of costs and benefits of the 
decision to delay euro adoption up until 2030.
Balance of measurable effects
The balance of measurable costs and benefits of delaying monetary integration is 
negative in the case of Poland, and increases with time. According to our estimates, 
the annual net cost (i.e. the difference between combined measureable costs and 
benefits) of not adopting the euro amounts to 0.7 per cent of GDP. The measurable 
costs of delaying the euro adoption includes higher transaction costs (0.7 per cent 
of GDP), costs arising from higher interest rates for firms and households (0.6 per 
cent of GDP) and higher costs of public debt servicing (0.3 per cent of GDP). They 
are only partially compensated by the savings arising from not converting the zloty 
to euro (0.9 per cent of GDP). It should be remembered, however, that the savings 
are one-off, while the costs of delaying integration are fixed. In other words, the 
costs of delaying the decision to adopt the euro accumulate over time.
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Over the coming years we will witness a gradual decrease in the benefits of de-
laying the decision to adopt the euro, caused by the gradual decline of the real cost 
of currency conversion – we estimate that in 2030 they will amount only to 0.5 per 
cent of GDP. This downward trend results from the increase in the use of cashless 
payments and ICT solutions, while the cost of physical exchange of notes and coins 
will remain relatively stable. What may increase however are the costs arising from 
higher interest rates, as the supply of credit to the private sector increases. There 
will be no change – in relation to GDP – of transaction costs and costs of debt servic-
ing. In the case of the former, the increase in trade of Polish products and services 
denominated in euro will be counterbalanced by a decrease in the fees and spreads 
connected to currency exchange as non-financial institutions will increase their 
market share and decrease transactional costs. Additionally, following the Ministry 
of Finance outlook, we assume a stable ratio of public PLN-denominated debt to 
GDP and a constant spread between domestic and foreign bond yields. 
Summing up, the annual measurable net cost of delaying euro adoption by Po-
land will increase twofold over the next decade to 1.3 per cent of GDP in 2030. This 
finding is consistent with previous quantitative analyses, which similarly suggested 
that delaying monetary integration will lead to economic losses for Poland.  
Balance of potential costs and benefits
The balance of potential costs and benefits is difficult to carry out due to difficulties 
in estimating the correct magnitude and probability of occurrence of the phenom-
ena described in previous sections. In addition, what remains unknown is the scale 
of interdependencies between various probabilities, which additionally complicates 
the analysis. However, it should be emphasised that the balance is dependent in 
any case on the capabilities of the Polish administration to implement structural 
reforms benefiting the economy, the institutional transformation of the euro area, 
the EURPLN conversion rate and the responsibility of national fiscal policy imple-
mented after the euro is adopted. As a result we can only compare the magnitude 
of the potential costs and benefits of delaying adopting the euro, assuming a scenario 
where these effects fully materialise. This is only the case in a hardly definable long 
term (and not until 2030 as we were able to do for the balance of measurable costs 
and benefits).
The potential costs of delaying monetary integration have been studied in detail 
(Pełnomocnik Rządu ds. Wprowadzenia Euro przez Rzeczpospolitą Polską, 2010). 
The most important of these is the potential increase in domestic demand, espe-
cially investment. Assuming the most optimistic of the scenarios outlined in section 
2, lower interest rates and transaction costs resulting from euro adoption could 
boost domestic demand by as much as 7 per cent of GDP, to which an increase in 
investment outlays would have the highest contribution. A further 0.5 percentage 
point would arise from an increase in net exports – export itself would increase 
over the long-term by 5.6 per cent (under the assumption that the risk premium on 
Polish sovereign bonds would not drop significantly). Foregone profits of the ECB 
are a marginal cost of delaying integration. Assuming that Poland would receive an 
amount comparable to that from 2018, the cumulative loss of additional general 
government revenues until 2030 would equal 0.5 per cent of GDP. Summing up, the 
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total potential costs of delaying monetary integration can reach even 7.8 per cent 
of GDP in the long term. 
We estimate the total potential benefits of delaying the decision to adopt the 
euro at approx. 7.5 per cent of GDP. This means that they are at a marginally lower 
level than potential costs – most likely within measurement error. The benefits 
include predominantly the higher risk of a price bubble materialising on the real 
estate market if Poland joins the euro area prematurely. According to estimates 
of Cecchetti (2008) an overvaluation of real estate prices by 5 per cent can lead to 
as much as 4 per cent of GDP loss over the long term. It should be borne in mind, 
however, that these estimates are made in a scenario where the real estate prices 
are already overvalued, that is at the peak of the business cycle. On the other hand, 
the GDP loss can be even deeper, if the deviation of prices from trend after the euro 
adoption is significantly higher than 5 per cent (in Spain and Ireland it exceeded 
even 15 percent).
Equally difficult to estimate are the potential benefits of delaying the decision 
to adopt the euro arising from the Balassa-Samuelson effect. In our analysis we 
therefore assume as a benchmark the scale of deterioration of competitiveness in 
Spain measured as the increase in deficit in international trade of goods and services 
between 2001-2007, which equalled 2.8 per cent of GDP. Due to similarities between 
countries in terms of economic structure, institutional factors (Rapacki, 2015) and 
the comparability of the magnitude of the Balassa-Samuelson effect (Konopczak 
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and Welfe, 2017) it appears warranted to assume that the GDP loss due to lower 
competitiveness would materialise in Poland in a similar scale to the one in Spain. 
However, the estimates provided above should serve only to show the relative 
importance of the respective phenomena, rather than as a precise prediction of ac-
tual consequences of euro adoption in Poland. Further qualitative studies are re-
quired which could allow for a more precise measurement of potential costs and 
benefits and their probability of occurance.
Finally, it is essential to bear in mind that the consequences of monetary inte-
gration for Poland depend largely on the institutional preparedness of Poland, the 
EURPLN conversion rate and the restrictiveness of fiscal policy in the first years 
of full EMU membership (Rapacki, 2015; Kolodko and Postula, 2018). It should be 
further pointed out that the magnitude of potential costs and benefits decreases 
with economic convergence, which means that the variation of possible scenarios 
of GDP changes after euro adoption will decrease in time. As a corollary the risks 
(and therefore costs) arising from a premature euro adoption will fall in the forth-
coming decade.
Balance of non-measurable costs  
and benefits
The balance of non-measurable costs and benefits is subjective and depends pre-
dominantly on one's  political preferences. Delaying the decision to adopt the euro 
means that Poland enjoys greater perceived independence in matters such as de-
termining its institutional architecture and pursuing independent fiscal and social 
policy. If one considers that independent domestic monetary policy (independent 
of the ECB) ensures sufficient stability and security of the Polish capital market, 
the benefits of delaying the common currency accession will significantly outweigh 
its costs. This would be the case in particular for those who consider that joining 
the euro should be avoided in general, and that influence over EMU institutional 
set-up is irrelevant.
On the other hand, those who assume that the creation of the common currency 
area is indeed irreversible or at least that the EMU will not disintegrate in the fore-
seeable future, will point to the potential costs of delaying integration and will argue 
that decisions made within the euro area are already largely influencing the eco-
nomic situation in Poland. From an economic point of view, the inability to access 
the euro area budget, of which Poland would undoubtedly be a net beneficiary (as is 
the case for the EU budget) is a cost which is relevant for both the eurosceptics and 
euroenthusiasts. Nonetheless, until the scale of possible fund transfers to Poland 
remains unknown, it is unlikely that this argument will determine the direction of 
the Polish public debate on the adoption of the euro.
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Summary
Our cost-benefit analysis of Poland delaying its euro adoption does not provide a clear-cut 
answer to the questions of “whether” and “for how long” the government should refrain 
from pursuing further monetary integration with the common currency area. Although 
the balance of measurable costs and benefits indicates that adopting the euro in the 
near future would give an additional boost to economic development, the effect would 
most likely be small – within the GDP forecast error. Moreover, with delayed monetary 
integration, the measurable costs will fall in real terms. On the other hand, the benefits 
of monetary integration will grow in time, which also indicates that the delay will not be 
too expensive for Poland in measurable terms.
It is the balance of potential costs and benefits, however, which is key to finding the 
right timing for euro adoption by a country such as Poland. A premature and poorly pre-
pared monetary integration can lead to large economic losses - significantly exceeding 
the measurable savings from the early adoption of the euro. Thus, adopting the euro in 
haste could hamper Poland's economic development for many years ahead, as was argu-
ably the case with Greece. In turn, preceding euro adoption with a thorough institutional 
preparation, especially by reforming the functioning of the labour and financial markets, 
and ensuring that conversion is done at a relatively weak EURPLN conversion rate and is 
accompanied by a responsible, non-populist fiscal policy (i.e. maintaining budgetary di-
scipline even in times of prosperity), would ensure that EMU membership is an additional 
growth stimulus for Poland in the coming decades, just as was the case of Ireland.
Finally, it should be noted that the balance of costs and benefits of delaying the ad-
option of the euro also depends on the public opinion factors, namely on the subjective 
ex ante assessment of the likelihood of positive and negative consequences materialising. 
Currently the majority of public opinion in Poland are against adopting the common cur-
rency. This can be explained by the fact that after the global financial crisis and the conco-
mitant fiscal crisis in some eurozone countries, the subjectively perceived risks associated 
with the common currency (i.a. price bubbles, loss of competitiveness, inflation) are so 
high, that in the public perception the benefits from delaying euro adoption outweigh the 
costs. What is more, most politicians do not engage with the debate on EMU membership 
in Poland as they see no interest in joining the euro zone and convincing the public opi-
nion to do so, because they are afraid of limiting their own policy-setting independence.
Finally, the ongoing reform of the euro area will impact the balance of potential costs 
and benefits in any case. Emerging EMU institutions and new risk-sharing mechanisms, 
although they cannot fully replace national institutional preparedness, create a new fra-
mework for economic governance and crisis management. A growing non-measurable 
cost of delaying the adoption of the single currency is, therefore, the limited impact on 
the shape of the future EMU architecture, including whether, and to what extent, it will 
ultimately be conducive to the growth of Eurozone as a whole, including economies such 
as Poland. 
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